The Problem of Realism


Is there a reality outside of ourselves? That is one of the two questions that define metaphysics. Imagine it arises in a discussion. Virginia just presented the reasoning that lead her to this question (see previous post). Virginia quotes a German philosopher, Friedrich Schelling (see here):

The one basic prejudice, to which all others reduce, is no other than this: that there are things outside us. This is a conviction that rests neither on grounds nor on inferences (since there is not a single reputable proof of it) and yet cannot be extirpated by any argument to the contrary (naturam furea expellas, tamen usque redibit); it makes claim to immediate certainty, since it assuredly relates to something entirely different from us, and even opposed to us, of which we understand not at all how it enters into immediate consciousness; and hence it can be regarded as nothing more than a prejudice – innate and primary, to be sure – but no less a prejudice on that account.

Her interlocutor Ayn, desperate about so much abstraction and otherworldliness, besides with a facepalm, is tempted to react in a typical way: touch Virginia’s hand; punch her; fuck her; envite lightning to strike her; arrange for her to mis her flight back home, right before the beginning of a quarantine - you get the idea.

‘There,’ she says to Virginia, ‘I just proved to you there is a world outside of you.’ What Ayn tries to convey to Virginia is that reality manifests itself, inadvertedly, directly, precisely; in the words of Schelling and Hegel: immediately (unmittelbar).

Virginia is a broad minded girl. Her first reaction is to protest neither the physical violence, nor the rape, nor the anger of the gods, nor the abduction (although she should). She sighs and explains to Ayn that Ayn is missing the point.

Obviously Virginia is aware - through actions and reactions - of reality; she acknowledges - consciously - a world outside of her own consciousness. But it is with self-consciousness that one falls into the weeds. On the level of thought, if thought is allowed its own tools (representations and steps of reasoning), and only those, anybody will experience that one cannot, in a non-occult way, transcend one’s own thoughts and representations. One can always append ‘consciousness of’ or ‘representation of’ to any experience.

True, if Ayn would suddenly punch Virginia, the latter would very likely not be able to remain conscious of representing. The instance she gets punched, she would not be aware of the representation, but simply have it. She would be immersed in the representation. Immediately nothing is more obvious than the coincidence of one’s experience (Virginia experiencing a fist hitting her face) and its content (a fist hitting Virginia’s face). Representations only give way to other representations, if one remains remains conscious of the act of representating and thinking, during this process. By punching her, Ayn is only showing to Virginia that she is not always conscious of being conscious. Clearly, this Virginia was already aware of. Isn’t it the whole point of philosophy to something over and above immediate experience.


One can check out the original German System des transzendentalen Idealismus):

Das Eine Grundvorurteil, auf welches alle andern sich reduzieren, ist kein anderes, als daß es Dinge außer uns gebe; ein Fürwahrhalten, das, weil es nicht auf Gründen noch auf Schlüssen beruht (denn es gibt keinen einzigen probehaltigen Beweis dafür), und doch durch keinen entgegengesetzten Beweis sich ausrotten läßt (naturam furca expellas, tamen usque redibit), Ansprüche macht auf unmittelbare Gewißheit, da es sich doch auf etwas von uns ganz Verschiedenes, ja uns Entgegengesetztes bezieht, von dem man gar nicht einsieht, wie es in das unmittelbare Bewußtsein komme, – für nichts mehr als für ein Vorurteil – zwar für ein angeborenes und ursprüngliches – aber deswegen nicht minder für Vorurteil geachtet werden kann.